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IN THE SUPREM.E CO'URT

of the
STA-rE OF U'TAH
THE s.TA:T·E INS URANCE F·UND,
1

Plaintiff,
-vs.T;HE INDUS:TRIAL ~c:O·MMISSION
OF UTAH, and JAME~S F. TAYLO·R,
and UNIT·ED PARK ~CI'T'Y MINE·S
CO:MPANY,
D·efendants.

Case
No.

10219

BRIEF OF D·EFENDANT JA1fE,S F. TAYLOR
NATiURE OF T·HE CAS.E
This is an appeal from the Industrial Commission of
Utah.
DISPOSITION BEFO·RE THE
IND·UST·RIAL CO·MMIS.SION
On June 15, 1964, defendant Jarnes F. Taylor \vas
awarded compensation for total and perrnanent disability due to silicosis under the provisions of Chapt<·r 2,
Title 35, U. C.A. 1953. The a\vard was made against 1Tnited Park City Mines Company and the State Insurane<>
Fund, its occupational disease insurance carr i P r.
1

RE·LIEF SO·UGH·T IN P:L.AIN·TIF·F''S PETITION
The plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, seeks to
have the Supreme Court reverse, vacate and annul the
award which the Industrial ~c·ommission rnade to James
F. T·aylor, in so far as it relates to the liability of thP
1
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State Insurance Fund to pay the benefits set forth in
the Order of ·The Industrial Commission.
S·TATEMEN·T· OF FACT·S
D·efendant, James F. Taylor, agrees with the statement of facts contained in plaintiff's brief, but notes
certain additions thereto.
James F. Taylor filed his claim dated May 9', 1962
for .disability due to the occupational disease of silicosis,
with the Industrial Com1nission of Utah on June±, 1962
(R. 1, 90).
ARGUME·NT
POINT I
DEFENDANT TAYLOR WAS EXPOSED TO HARMFUL
QUANTITIES OF SILICON DIOXIDE DUST FOR MORE
THAN FIVE YEARS BETWEEN JUNE 4, 1947 AND JUNE
4, 1962.

Prior to April 20, 1938, defendant Taylor had in
excess of thirteen years of harmful exposure to silicon
dioxide dust while employed by Silver King ,c·oalition
Mines Company in underground mining as a mucker,
motorman and a pipe and track man. (R. 56-57)
Commencing January 31, 1939, Mr. ·T·aylor acted
as a watchman and worked on the surface for Silver
King ~Coalition Mines Co1npany.
Between January 1, 19·39' and 1950 ~Ir. Taylor in his
e1nploy1nent as a watch1nan for the Silver King ,c·oalition
Mines Cornpany "ras required to punch various time
clock stations located in the sampler and the flotation
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1nill of the Co1npany. To reach these various stations
Mr. Taylor passed through the Inain haulage way from
the 1nain shaft to the Inill and sampler, which is enclosed
in a weather tight snow shed. The passage of the ore
and waste trains created a dust condition similar to that
in underground haulage (R. 65·-69). In the sampler,
the concentrated dry ores are dumped by a skip into
large bins falling approximately 100 feet. From these
bins they are drawn out into buckets of an aerial tramway for shipment to Park City (R. 69'-70). Mr. Taylor,
in the course of his employment, during the afternoon
and graveyard shifts of each working day, was required
to punch each station five times on the afternoon shift
and eight times on the graveyard shift (R. 70). Other
stations located in the flotation mill required passage
through the crushing department of the mill and across
the crude bins of the mill four times each shift (R. 71-72).
In September of 1950, Mr. Taylor became watchman
at the P'ark 'City terminal of the aerial tramway, wherein the concentrated ores were dumped into bins in the
terminal building preparatory to ship1nent in railroad
cars. The concentrated ores were loaded into box cars
by a mechanical belt device which threw the ores from
the door of the box cars to the extreme ends. All of
such activity produced exposure to silicon dioxide dust
(R. 73-75).

·On May 8, 1953, the Silver l(ing 'Coalition Mines
Company merged with the Park Utah 'Consolidated
Mines 'C'ompany and became the United Park City
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Mines Co1npany. Mr. Taylor was off \vork because of a
strike and shutdown between August 15, 1952 and October 22, 1954 (R. 59-60), during \vhich time the merger
took place. Upon return to work, Mr. Taylor was transferred by United Park City ~fines ~Company to thP
watchman job at the Judge unit. Mr. Taylor, in
the course of his employment, would sweep a half carbide can of mine ore and waste from the floor of the
change room each shift (R.. 75-76). He was required to
sweep and clean the haulage way and the snow shed
which became littered from mine ores being shipped by
leasers. Further exposure to dust was created by dumping the ores from the floor of the snow shed to trucks.
below for shipment (R. 76-77). This course of employment continued until Mr. Taylor was laid off June 30,
19'61.
The exposure of ~{r. Taylor upon his recall to work
between February 3, 1962 and February 8, 1962 was no
different than his exposure bet\veen October 22, 19·54
and June 30, 1961. It is significant that he \vorked shifts
of twelve hours each and \vas required to and did shovel
a ton and one-half of coal into a hopper approximately
5-1/2 feet high (R. 106). We subn1it this to be rather
vigorous activity for a Inan whom plaintiffs would have
this Court believe to be totally disabled prior to this
time in order to bar his clai1n by application of the one
:Tear statutP of limitations.
WP submit that the Co1nmission's finding the def(~ndant Taylor \vas exposed to harinful quantities of
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silicon dioxide dust for a total period of Inore than five
years in this State during the fifteen years immediately
preceding his disablement, is supported by substantial
co1npetent evidence having probative value.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM WAS FILED
TIME LIMITATION OF 35-2-48, U.C.A. 1953.

WITHIN THE

We believe it to be fundrunental law that a statute
of limitations does not commence to run until a cause
of action arises. A cause of action arises under the Occupational Disease Act when there is a disability or
death due to an occupational disease.
What is the meaning of the term "disability"~ The
term is defined in the Act at 35-2-12 u.~c·.A. 1953, the
pertinent parts of which are set forth as follows:

"35-2-12. CONS·CT·RUC·TIO·N OF TE~RMS.
-The following terms as used in this act shall be
construed as follows :
" (a) 'Disablement' means the event of becoming physically incapacitated by reason of an
occupational disease as defined in this act from
performing any work for remuneration or profit.
Silicosis, as defined in this act, when complicated
by active pulmonary tuberculosis, shall be presumed to be total disablement. 'Disability', 'disabled', 'total disability,' or 'totally disabled' shall
be synonymous with 'disablement', but they shall
have no reference to 'partial permanent disability'.
'' ( e') 'Partial p·ermanent disability', as herein
used, is defined as that pathological condition di-
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rectly resulting froin an occupational disease and
causing substantial physical impairment, evidenced by objective medical and clinical findings
readily demonstrable, and which has reduced the
e~arning capacity of the employee, excluding, however, total disability cases." (Emphasis ours)
Plaintiff argues that defendant Taylor was disabled
when he first demonstrated symptoms of silicosis. This
argument assumes that the first stages of silicosis are
tantamount to disability in some form which starts the
statute of limitation running. This argument ignores
the facts shown in the record that defendant was gainfully employed from 19'3'3 when the first symptoms of
silicosis were noted to the 30th day of June, 19·64 when
defendant was laid off because of a reduction in forces.
D'efendant Taylor was physically capable of returning to
work during the period from February 3rd to February
8th of 19 62 inclusive and performing work for remuneration or profit while working a 12 hour shift on each
of the days included in the period. (R. 111) The work
record of the defendant Taylor is a part of the record of
this case (R. 116) and is as follows:
1

"'Silver King ~c·oaiition Mines Company
19~25

to 4-20-38
Underground trackman
1-31-39 to 7-1-50
Surface Watchman
9-16-50 to 8-15-52
Surface watchman
United p·ark City Mines Company
10-22-54 to 6-30-61
Surface watchman
2-3-62 to 2-8-6·2
Surface watchman
Defendant's \vork record demonstrates that during
his entire \vorking life he has been employed by the Sil-
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ver King ~Coalition l\lines Company or its successor in
interest, the United Park 'City Mines Company. Breaks
in the work record are accounted for by industrial disruptions, shut-doV\rns and a disabling non-indusrial accident suffered by defendant T·aylor.
Defendant's record of earnings during the course of
his employment by United Park City Mines is significant
in that it indicates the defendant was regularly and gainfully employed between October 22., 1954 to June 30,
1961. Defendant's earnings during this period are a part
of the record and are as follows :
"10-2'2 to 12-31-54
1-1 to 12-31-55
1-1 to 12-31-56
1-1 to 12-31-57
1-1 to 12-31-58
1-1 to 12-31-59
1-1 to 12-31~60
1-1 to 6-30-6·1

$ 557.09
4,154.39
4,316.22
4,521.39
4,472.85
4,483.15
4,262.89
2,183.97

(R.
(R.
(R.
(R.
(R.
( R.
( R.
( R..

118)
134)
119')
120)
121)
122)
123)
124)

D·efendant was recalled to and did work between
February 3rd and February 8th, 1962 and earned thP
sum of $98.63 (R. 125).
We think the earning record of the defendant clearly
and fairly demonstrates that he was regularly engaged
in work for remuneration or profit during the aforernentioned period.
As a matter of law that defendant could not be either
totally disabled or partially disabled during the period
ending June .30, 19·61.
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Defendant was still physically able to return to work
at the request of his employer and resume his normal
occupation of watchman during the p·eriod between February 3rd and February 8th, 1964, working 12 hour shifts
and shoveling a ton and a half of coal into a hopper approximately 5-1/2 feet high (R. 106).
Defendant Taylor filed his application dated May
9, 19'62 with the Industrial Commission on June 4, 1962.
This is less than four months from his February, 19,62
employment and less than one year from his continuous
course of employment commencing in October of 1954
and ending June 30, 1961.
1

The ~Commission found that his tentative permanent
and total disability commenced as of June 4, 1962·. We
submit that the sole question here is, whether or not
there has been a mis-application of law, or is there no
substantial evidence furnishing a reasonable basis to
support a material find of fact~ The State Insurance
Fund vs. The Industrial Commission of Utah,------ Utah
------, 395 P.2d 541, ~case No. 10095, September, 1964.
There seems to be no doubt by plaintiff that the defendant is disabled from the occupational disease of silicosis. The only question is as to "\Vhen the total disability
occurred and \Ye submit that the Commission's finding of
June 4, 19,62 is amply supported by the law and the evidence.
As to the portion of the plaintiff's brief wherein
it is argued, since defendant Taylor was partially disablPd sineP 1952; and, sineP ht• failed to file an application
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for partial disability within one year after the alleged
disability, his claim for total disability is barred by application of the one year statute of limitations ; fails,
for several reasons.
First, upon the basis of the records and files in this
case, we do not believe that a finding of partial disability
prior to June 30, 19'61 can be supported. There would
also be grave doubt as to the supportability of any finding of partial disability prior to the period of einployment between February 3rd and February 8, 1962.
Second, even if a finding were made of permanent
partial disability subsequent to June 30, 1961, it would
be within the time limit of the one year statute of limitations contained in 35-2-48, l_,.CA 1953, which is not applicable to partial disability.
Third, the limitation of action set forth in 35-2-48,
UCA 1g.53 does not apply to partial per1nanent disability,
because the limitation of action provision of this Section
is contained in 35-2-5·6 (b), UCA 1953 which is as follows:
''(b) No compensation shall be paid unless such
partial disability results within two years prior
to the day upon which claim for co1npensation was
filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah."
Fourth, it is the position of defendant Taylor that
the provisions for total disability contained in 35-2-1:;
and the provisions for partial permanent disability contained in 35-2-56, UCA 1953 create separate and distinct
causes of action. A review of the legislative history of
the two provisions will show that there was no liability
1
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for partial disability, until the latter section was added
by the L~aws of Utah, 1949, Chapter 51, Section 2. See
the case of Masich vs. United States Smelting, Refining
and Mining Co., 113 Ut. 101, 191 P.2d 612, wherein it was
held that the Occupational Disease Act, Laws of Utah
1941, 'Chapter 41, had pre-empted the field of disability
due to silicosis and that even though there were no provisions for partial permanent disability, there \vas no
common law action for partial permanent disability due
to silicosis.
Fifth, with the passage of the partial permanent disability section, Laws of Utah, 19'49, ~Chapter 51, Section
2, the Legislature saw fit to deal with partial disability.
The conditions precedent to a claim for total disability
due to silicosis are set forth in 35-2-13, UCA 1953, and
may be summarized as follows:
1. The last day of injurious exposure must
be subsequent to July 1, 1941.
2. There must be exposure to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust for a period
of five years during the fifteen years prior
to disability; and
(a) Disability must result within two
years for uncomplicated silicosis;
(b) Disability must result within five
years for silico-tuberculoss
from the last day worked for the employer
against whom compensation is claimed.
3. The claim must be filed pursuant to 35-248, UCA 1953, within one year after the
cause of action arises.
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The conditions precedent to a claim for partial permanPnt disability are set forth in 35·-2-56, UCA 19'53 and may
be summarized as follows :
1. T·he last day of injurious exposure must
be subsequent to July 1, 1941.
2. Partial disability must result within two
years prior to the day upon which the
claim was filed.
3. p·artial disability must result within two
years of the date of last exposure.
We submit that the Legislature in providing for
partial permanent disability for silcosis elected to treat
partial disability in a substantially different manner
than it treated total disability. The conditions precedent
are different, as well as a different statute of limitations.
As a practical matter, a simple way to emasculate the
total disability provision of the Occupational Disease
Act would be to adopt the theory urged by the plaintiff.
Those applicants filing their claim with the Industrial
·Commission for total disability, who had not prevously
filed a claim for partial permanent disability, would be
barred by the statute of limitations. We urge that it is
the duty of this ·Court to interpret these provisions so
that the intent of the Legislature in allowing compensation for partial permanent disability due to silicosis will
not thwart an applicant whose disability has become total
as measured by the provisions of the Act.
Assume the case of an employee who suffers from
silicosis which would be classified .as non-disabling, per
se; assume that the employee continued in his einploy-
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rnent and was gainfully ernployed, even though he rnight
suffer occasional loss of time because of the progressive
nature of his disease but of insufficient amount to entitle him to any rneasurahle compensation, in essence,
the beginning of a reduction of his earning capacity;
assume that the employee is rernoved from exposure type
employment and continues for more than two years in
this employment; then assume that the employee contracts a case of tuberculosis super-imposed upon the silicosis; under plaintiff's theory the employee is barred
from filing for his total disability because he failed to
file for partial disability.
We submit that the adoption by this Court of plaintiff's theory will have harsh and unwarranted results.
The solution is simply to treat the two causes of action
separately as they were intended to be treated by the
Legislature. The treatment is not without precedent in
this jurisdiction where in this Court in Pacific States
Cast Iron P'ipe Company vs. Industrial Commission, 18
Ut. 46, 218 P.2.d 970, held that there were two separate
and· distinct claims pending before the Commission in
that the death claim of the dependent is a separate and
distinct cause of action from the one running to the deceased because of his injuries.
Sixth, while defendant Taylor does not concede that
there is any factual basis to support a finding of partial
disability prior to February 8, 1962, Mr. ,T·aylor submits
that as a matter of la-,v, the running of a statute of limitations upon a claim for permanent partial disability due
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to silicosis, does not bar a claim for total disability due
to silicosis.
P1aintiff cites and argues State Insurance Fund vs.
Industrial Comrnission, 116 Ut. 279, 209 P.2d 558, referred to hereafter as the Lunnen case, which cites and discusses Marsh vs. Industrial Accident Commission, 217
Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 9.33, 86 A.L.R. 563. Defendant Taylor
has no quarrel with the doctrine announced in these
cases. Rather, it is felt that the plaintiff ignores the
doctrine of the cases. There is a distinction between the
symptoms of the progressive disease known as silicosis
and the disability produced by the disease. Plaintiff refuses to recognize that disability is a word of art and
must be construed in accordance with the definitions
contained in 35-2.-12, U.C.A. 1953. The cases talk about
disability, not symptoms. We believe this can be illustrated by quoting the rule of the Lunnen case set forth
in plaintiff's brief and found at P.age 283, Volume 116,
Utah Reports:
"The better rule which is in accord with reason and justice, is that a cause of action does not
arise until an ascert.ainable disability and compensable disability results."
This is the rule adopted in California. See Marsh vs.
lndu~trial Accident Commisson *** (emphasis added)
Again, illustrating the defendant's contention by directing the ~Court's attention to the portion of Marsh vs.
Industrial Accident Com.mission (cited above) quoted
by plaintiff's brief, commencing at Page 9·38 of 18 P.2d:
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"Froin our study of the subject we are
brought to the conclusion that in the case of a
latent and progressive disease, such as pneumoconiosis, it cannot reasonably be said that the injury dates necessarily from the last day of exposure to a dust-laden atmosphere and that the
prescriptive period hegins to run from that date.
Rather, according to our view, should the date of
the injury be deemed the time when the accumulated effects culminate in a disability traceable
to the latent disease as a primary cause, and by
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence it
is discoverable and apparent that a compensable
injury was sustained in performance of the duties
of the employment." (emphasis added)
Again direeting the Court's attention to State of
Ca,Zifornia, Subsequent Injuries Fund, Petitioner, vs.
Industrial Accident Commission of the State of California, ______ Cal. ------, 304 P.2d 112 at Page 114·, the doctrine,
again emphasized by italics:
"The date of injury in cases of occupational
disease is that date upon which the employee first
suffered disability therefrom, and either knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
known, that said disability was caused by his present or prior employment."
Nor do we believe that the case of Universal Granite
Quarries Compa.ny vs. Tndustrial Commission, 224 Wise.
680, 27:2 NW 863, assists the position of the plaintiff.
In this case a stone cutter, age 69· years, after some 40
years' exposure became sick and disabled in January
of 1g.32. In FebruarY•' and March of 1932 his illness was
diagnosed as tuberculosis. He was treated for tuber-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
culosis and in the Fall of 1934 the X-ray fihns diagnosed
silicosis. He filed within thirty days of the X-ray diagnosis of silicosis. The ·Commission found:
"The applicant knew that he had tuberculosis
about February or March, 19.32; that he did not,
however, know that he had silicosis or that his
tuberculosis was caused by silicosis or by his
employment until ex-rays were taken in the latter part of the year 1934 * * * that the applicant
did not know until within thirty days prior to
notice to the respondent, nor ought he to have
known, the nature of his disability and its relation
to his employment."
The Supre1ne ~c·ourt reversed the Commission indicating that the applicant was aware that stone dust was
causing his sickness as early as 1930-31. He became sick
in January and was completely disabled since that date.
His claim was filed in the Fall of 1934, which is substantially in excess of the two year statute of limitations
applicable in Wisconsin. Applying this case to the Utah
Act, we would agree that the statute of limitations would
run one year after the diagnosis of tuberculosis. Under
35-2-12, UCA 1953, silicosis complicated by active pulmonary tuberculosis shall be presumed to be total disablement.
However, under the same definition found in 35-212, UCA 1953, the defendant T·aylor could not be found
to be totally disabled prior to February 8, 1962. He filed
June 30, 1962, well within the one year statute of liinitations.
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The only case which supports plaintiff's contention
is that of Hutchinson vs. Semler, 227 Ore. 437, 361 P.2d
803, decided May 10, 1951 ; rehearing denied June
14, 1961, 362 P.2d 704. However, in reading the Hutchinson case, we were suprized to learn that the subject
matter of that action was a common law action for damages. The Occupational Disease Act is the sole and exclusive remedy of an applicant in Utah. The common law
defenses of the fellow servant rule, contributory negligence and assumption of risk have been eliminated by
our Act. The Oregon Court in Hutchinson concurred in
the doctrine laid down in U rie vs. Thompson, 337 U.S.
163 ; 69 S. Ct. 1018, 1025; 93 L.E.d. 1282; 11 A.L.. R. 2d
252, and announcing the following rule:
1

"We concur in the rule enunciated in the Urie
case and believe that their prior decisions are in
accord with it. Thus, the statute of limitations
began to run in the case at bar when the plaintiff became apprised, or as a reasonable man
should have known, that his health was being under mined by the dust which he was breathing."
We do not quarrel with the rule announced by either
the Hutchinson or the U rie case. We believe it to be the
proper rule to apply in the case of a negligence action
for exposure to har1nful or poisonous substances. However, it is not the proper rule to be applied to the Utah
Occupational Disease Act which is a creature of statute
and not the common law. The concept of disability is the
concept created by the statute and. there can be no claim
until there is a disability.
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We again subinit that Ineasured by the standards
of 35-2-12, -ucA 1953, there was no total disability prior
to February 8, 1962 and no evidence to support a finding
of partial disability prior to June 30, 19'61. The ComInission has found that defendant Taylor became totally
disabled as of June 4, 1962 which, in either event, is less
than four months from his last exposure or employment
and less than one year from a continuous course of employment dating back to October 22, 1954. We submit
that there has been not misapplication of law and that
there is substantial evidence furnishing a reasonable basis to support the material findings of fact.
POINT III
LIABILITY MAY BE IMPOSED UPON THE STATE INSURANCE FUND AS CARRIER, EVEN THOUGH APPLICANT WAS NOT EXPOSED UNDER THEIR COVERAGE
DURING A PERIOD OF THIRTY DAYS, OR MORE.

It is the position of defendant Taylor that liability
may be imposed upon the State Insurance Fund if, during the period in which the State Insurance Fund was
on the risk, Mr. Taylor was exposed to harinful quantities of silicon dioxide dust. This is the doctrine laid down
in the case of Pacific Employers Insurance Company vs.
Industrial Commission, 108 Utah 123, 157 P.2d 800, referred to as the Deza case:
"The insurance carrier at the tit ne of the last
exposure was the State Insurance Fund; this is
the date which fixes the liability of the employer,
and .consequently also attaches the liability to the
employer's insurance carrier as of that date; and
upon the whole record and from the clear wording
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of the statute, the decision of the Comntission
should have held the State Insurance Fund liable
for the payment of compensation awarded."
The Court will recall that the Industrial,Comntission
had awarded compensation against Pacific Employers
Insurance Company, who was the co1npensation carrier
on the risk at the time Deza became disabled .. The ,c·ourt,
in reversing the Commission, held that the carrier who
was on the risk at the time of the last exposure was liable,
which was the State Insurance Fund. D~eza had continued in the employ of the same employer, but during
the coverage of the Pacific Employers Insurance ~Com
pany was in non-exposure type employment.
Thus, we feel the rule to be clear, if defendant Taylor
was exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust
in his employment between February 3 and February 8,
1962., then the State Insurance Fund is the insurer who
should respond. We think the record clear that Mr. ·Taylor resumed his normal duties as watchman and in the
course of these duties was exposed to quantities of silicon
dioxide dust which to him were harmful. During the
course of each 12 hour shift worked during this period
defendant Taylor swept the change room floor (R. 75, 7-6,
79') and the snow shed (R. 80). During the February
period Mr. T'aylor's activities at work were essentially
the same as they were during his prior employment at
the Judge Unit (R. 179). While occupied in the sweeping
of the change roo1n defendant Taylor would be sweeping
for at least thirty minutes each shift (R. 99·, 110). The
swet~ping activity would produce a one-half carbide can

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
full of Inine dust (R~. 110), which defendant Taylor indicates as a can about half again as high as the waste
basket in the hearing room (R. 113).
Defendant Taylor in the course of his watching activities vvas required to travel through the snow shed
·wherein the dust condition \\Tas aggravated by the passage of the trains hauling the ores and waste from the
1nine (R. 76, 112). Defendant Taylor also swept the snow
shed during the February period (R. 79, 80).
It is readily apparent and the record so shows that
Mr. T'aylor's activity during the period between February 3 and February 8, 196.2 was not substantially different than his activity between Oetober 22, 1954 and June
30, 1961. It is possible that this activitiy alone in a normal unexposed employee would not produce harmful effects. However, in an employee such as defendant Taylor, who has had some thirteen years of extremely harm ..
ful underground exposure, the exposure in his watchman
duties was an exposure to harmful quantities of silicon
dioxide dust as to him. We submit that there is a casual
relationship between this last exposure and Taylor's ultimate disability which occured June 4, 19'62.
Plaintiff directs the Court's attention to Seetion
35-2-14, UCA 1953, which is as follows:
"***in the case of silicosis the only employer
liable shall the employer in whose employinent the
employee was last exposed to harmful quantities
of silicon dioxide ( Si0 2 ) dust during a p·eriod of
thirty days or more after the effective date of
this act.''
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And, in effect, urges upon this ·Court the proposition
that the defendant must be in the einploy of the ernployer and in the coverage of the insurance carrier during a
thirty day period since the effective date of this Act.
The dangers of this theory were pointed out to the Court
in the briefs filed in the State Insur.ance Fund vs. The
Industrial ·Commission of Utah, 395 P.2d 541. The clear
intent of this statute, in our opinion, is to differentiate
between employers. It is not the last employer who is
liable, but only the last employer who exposes the ernployee to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust during a period of thirty days. There is only one employer
in this action. What we are determining is which of two
insurance carriers should respond.
We do not agree with the contention of the plaintiff
the State Insurance Fund vs. Industrial Commission,
·----- Utah ______ , 3~65 P.2d 541, controls this case in that the
insurer must be on the risk for a period of thirty days or
more. This case merely holds that, as to an employer, the
employee need not \vork each day of the thirty day period
nor need he be harmfully exposed each day during such
period. It only requires harmful exposure and employInent during a period of thirty days. We submit that
35-2-14, U:CA 1953, is not available to the insurer. His
liability is based upon whether or not there is a casual
connection between the exposure and the resulting disability. WP submit that there is ample evidence to sustain the ·Commission's findings that the applicant was
exposed to harmful quanities of silicon dioxide dust during the period between February 3 and February 8, 1962.
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Being on the risk and the employer having exposed defendant Taylor to the harmful quantities during this period, the insurance carrier upon the risk at this time
should respond.
We sub1nit, that in a disease such as silicosis where
the exposure is cun1ulative, liability is imposed on the
last employer exposing the employee to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust during a period of thirty
days. The employer Inay not escape liability because· as
a practical matter the overwhelming majority of the
employee's exposure was in the employ of another employer. Kennecott Copper Corporation vs. Industrial
Commission, 115 Utah 451, 205 P.2d 829.
Hence, as to insurance carriers, the principle announced in Pacific Employers Insurance Company vs.
Industrial Commission, 108 Utah 123, 157 P.2d 800, the
~Court should impose liability on the insurer who was on
the risk at the,
"***date of the last exposure of the applicant to
harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust,***"
without the limitation of a period of thirty d.ays. Such
a rule will be definite and put these matters to rest so
that they may be handled on the administrative level
rather than in the Supreme Court. Some hardship may
result in that an insurer may be on a risk for a short
time and suffer liability; however, the possibilities are
just as good that the same insurance co1npany will escape liability just as often by the application of such a
rule. Otherwise, there will be continuing periods of non-
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coverage for a period of thirty days with each change
of insurers.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we submit that there has
been no misapplication of law and that the findings of
the ~Commission are supported by substantial evidence
furnishing a reasonable basis to support such findings
of fact. The Order of the 'Commision awarding compensation to James F. Taylor should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRAYTON, LOWE, & HURLEY
AND~RE:W R. HURLEY
Attorneys for Defendant
James F. Taylor

R.eceived three copies of the foregoing brief this
________________ day of December, 1964.

ICiHARLE:S WEL CH, JR.
Attorney for Plaintiff
1

CLYDE., MECHAM & PRATT
Attorneys for Defendant
United Park City Mines ·Co.
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